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ABSTRACT
Defending against physical adversarial attacks is a rapidly growing
topic in deep learning and computer vision. Prominent forms of
physical adversarial attacks, such as overlaid adversarial patches
and objects, share similarities with digital attacks, but are easy
for humans to notice. This leads us to explore the hypothesis that
adversarial detectionmethods, which have been shown to be ineffec-
tive against adaptive digital adversarial examples, can be effective
against these physical attacks. We use one such detection method
based on autoencoder architectures, and perform adversarial patch-
ing experiments on MNIST, SVHN, and CIFAR10 against a CNN
architecture and two CapsNet architectures. We also propose two
modifications to the EM-Routed CapsNet architecture, Affine Voting
and Matrix Capsule Dropout, to improve its classification perfor-
mance. Our investigation shows that the detector retains some of
its effectiveness even against adaptive adversarial patch attacks. In
addition, detection performance tends to decrease among all the
architectures with the increase of dataset complexity.
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Deep-learning (DL) systems have shown tremendous success in
complex tasks such as image recognition [19], speech recogni-
tion [13], object detection, classification, tracking [10, 23], and so on.
Much research, however, has shown that DL systems are vulnerable
to digital adversarial examples, carefully crafted inputs to cause un-
intended behaviors. One method of defending against these attacks
is to detect the attacks and enable the system to formulate a new
action based on the detection. Even though a number of methods
have been proposed for detecting adversarial examples [12, 27] in
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the digital domain, these methods have shown to be ineffective
against an adaptive attacker [4] who targets a DL system to cause
misclassification and evade detection.
Growing research shows that similar vulnerabilities exist in the
physical domain as well [8, 22]. Physical adversarial attacks are
created to be robust to variance in scene and sensor factors such as
lighting, rotation, and distance, rather than merely making them
effective in a single example image. For example, attackers can craft
adversarial patches and place them anywhere within the field of
view of an object detector to suppress object detection [22]. This is
achieved through Expectation over Transformation (EOT) [1]. EOT
simulates a distribution of locations, orientations, and photometric
properties of the patch, and then optimizes the attack across the
dataset with the distribution applied. Unlike digital adversarial
examples, adversarial patches have to occupy a continuous area in
input images. This property makes them easy to be spot for humans,
for example in the cases of toaster patches [3] or printed t-shirts [38].
Adversarial patches are cheap to craft, and unlike digital adversarial
examples, can work in many scenarios. Adversarial patch attacks on
time-sensitive safety-critical systems, such as a self-driving car, can
jeopardize users as well as the general public. Detecting adversarial
patch attacks, however, has received considerably less attention
until recently.
We note that the only differences between the generation of
adversarial patches and digital adversarial examples are that: i)
adversarial patches are optimized over a distribution of input im-
ages rather than a single image, ii) adversarial patches are area
constrained rather than norm constrained. We thus hypothesize
that neural networks under attack by adversarial patches are behav-
iorally similar to neural networks under attack by digital adversarial
examples, and methods to detect adversarial perturbations can be
transferred over to detection of adversarial patches.
Intuitively, it should also be easier to automate the detection
of adversarial patches compared to digital adversarial examples,
as humans can easily spot them. To the best of our knowledge,
SentiNet [8] is the only prior work done on detecting adversarial
patches. SentiNet detects and segments adversarial objects from
input by leveraging the high salience and scene-transferability of
adversarial patches.
In this paper, we adapt a mechanism originally proposed to de-
tect digital adversarial perturbations [31] and empirically examine
its effectiveness against simulated physical adversarial attacks. In
particular, we examine the effectiveness of class-conditional recon-
structions [31] – which is lackluster in the digital domain – against
adversarial patches. We show that unlike digital adversarial exam-
ples, adaptive attacks using adversarial patches do not neutralize

























modified AlexNet as well as on a Capsule Network (CapsNet), a re-
cently proposed and arguably powerful neural architecture [14, 32].
CapsNets use layers of vector- or matrix-valued capsules that rep-
resent the poses and probabilities of objects and can also represent
part-whole relationships. Similar to how layers of neurons can
represent the extraction of higher-level features from lower-level
features in a standard neural network, layers of capsules can repre-
sent the extraction of higher-level objects from lower-level objects,
shapes, or lines. In addition, we propose an improved CapsNet ar-
chitecture incorporating Dropout and Affine Voting to enhance the
test set classification performance.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• We are the first to explore the effectiveness of a digital adver-
sarial example detection method in the adversarial patch do-
main, and demonstrate it on three standard datasets: MNIST,
SVHN, and CIFAR10.
• Weare the first to show the effectiveness of CapNets to classify
and detect adversarially patched input.
• Wepropose an improvedMatrix Capsule Networkwith capsule-
dropout and affine voting and empirically show their im-
proved test accuracy on the smallNORB dataset.
2 RELATEDWORK
Digital Adversarial Examples. Digital adversarial examples are
inputs slightly perturbed by attackers to cause unintended behav-
iors in deep-learning (DL) system. The creation of adversarial ex-
amples in the digital domain has been extensively studied using
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [6, 28, 34]. These digital
domain attacks typically assume that the threat actors can modify
pixels of the input images at will, and seek to optimize an adversar-
ial objective that would lead to misclassification subject to some
constraints on the amount of modification.
While many methods have been proposed to detect digitally per-
turbed adversarial input [9, 25, 26, 29, 39], none of these approaches
have been shown to be robust against an adaptive digital domain
attacker aware of the defense mechanism [4, 5, 31, 40]. Some of
the more promising approaches, however, force the attacker to
employ digital perturbations that are more noticeable to human
observers [9, 31, 39, 40].
Physical Adversarial Attacks. Unlike digital adversarial exam-
ples, physical adversarial attacks do not assume that an attacker
can manipulate any pixel on a particular input image. In the com-
puter vision setting, physical adversarial attacks produce an object
(which we generically refer to as a patch, as objects are but patches
of pixels in a 2d image) that tricks the image classifier into seeing a
particular type of object. These patches are designed to be robust to
variance in scene and sensor factors such as lighting, rotation, and
distance, rather than merely effective in a single example image.
This is achieved through Expectation over Transformation (EOT),
a method first proposed by Athalye et al. [1].
EOT simulates a distribution of locations, orientations, and pho-
tometric properties of the patch and then optimizes the attack across
all the data with the simulated distribution applied. Patches can
be designed to modify a specific target object to be classified or
to appear with any other objects. Attack that modifies the target
objects can directly manipulate the surfaces of the objects using
technologies such as 3D printing. One example of this attack pro-
duces an object that looks like a turtle to human but is classified as a
rifle by the neural network [1]. The second type of physical attacks
pose more threat to an undefended system, as they do not assume
the ability to modify the target object. Rather they place adversar-
ial objects or patches in the scene intended to interfere with the
neural networks. Examples of these attacks include i) hiding people
from detection through adversarial patches on t-shirts [35], ii) caus-
ing neural algorithms to lose track of vehicles through adversarial
patches [16].
The investigation of this paper is adversarial patch centric as
it requires relatively low cost to perform such attack. Adversarial
patches can fool a trained DL system tomisclassify [3] when applied
to a sticker or other objects. Unlike constraining the magnitude of
pixel change of digital adversarial examples, this class of attacks
constrains the payloads to be patches that cover a continuous area,
which makes it easy for humans to recognize.
Capsule Networks. Capsule networks are a recently proposed
alternative class of neural network architecture [14, 15, 18, 32]
that use layers of vector- or matrix-valued capsules, which rep-
resent the poses and probability of objects. Similar to how layers
of neurons can represent the extraction of higher-level features
from lower-level features in a standard neural network, layers of
capsules can represent the extraction of higher-level objects from
lower-level objects, shapes, or lines. A typical DNN consists of
layers of scalar-valued neurons that are connected together using
linear combinations and non-linear activation functions.
By contrast, in a capsule network, layers of capsules vote on the
poses and probability of higher level capsules, and the probabilities
of their existence are determined by a procedure known as Routing
by Agreement [14, 32]. Routing by Agreement eliminates the need
for pooling, a dimensionality reduction technique commonly used
in a CNN. Two approaches to this routing have been proposed, both
of which have the theoretical property of geometric equivariance.
This makes them robust to geometric transformations of objects
without the need tomemorizing different viewpoints and placement
of objects, and reduces the need for training data [14]. The first
approach, Dynamic Routing [32], measures agreement between
capsules using the dot product between votes and capsules that are
voted on, and use an 𝑎𝑑 − ℎ𝑜𝑐 squashing function to normalize the
final vector capsule output with the magnitude being its probability.
The Dynamic Routing implementation has shown state-of-the-art
performance in tasks such as medical image segmentation [21]. The
second approach, EM Routing [14], measures agreement between
votes usingGaussian clusters estimatedwith amodified Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm.
The EM Routing implementation allows the use of matrix cap-
sules, and is shown to generalize better to novel viewpoints while
requiring less data to train [14] on the smallNORB dataset, com-
pared to CNN. Our architecture is based onmatrix capsules with EM
Routing, the second implementation. Our proposed improvements
to the architecture are discussed in Section 4.3.
Digital Adversarial Example Detection with Reconstruction
Networks. MagNet [26] shows that autoencoders have the poten-
tial to counter adversarially perturbed input, which are outside of
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Figure 1: A deep-learning-based computer-vision system
(CVS), namely an autonomous vehicle, which should: i) cap-
ture an image of the stop sign from the physical world, ii)
feed the image into the trained deep neural network, and
iii) provide the classification output to a decision engine that
stops the car.
the manifold boundary of the normal input, by reconstructing the
input as if they are inside the normal manifold. This allows the de-
tection of digital adversarial examples when the class-conditioned
reconstruction is far from the provided input, a method first pro-
posed by Qin et al. [31]. The method feeds the class-conditioned
latent variables of the image classifier into a decoder network turn-
ing the architecture into an autoencoder. The decoder output then
outputs a tensor that attempts to reconstruct the input images
given latent variables that represent features of the predicted class
instance. In a capsule network, the latent variables are the class
capsule vectors or matrices in the final layer of the classifier. The
class conditional decoder can also be attached to a convolutional
network, albeit with some modifications to the penultimate layer
in the CNN [31]. The 𝐿2 distance between the reconstructed input
𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛 and the actual input 𝑥 , is minimized when training the net-
work. The adversarial detection function 𝑓𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡 , which outputs 1
when the input is considered to be adversarial, and 0 otherwise, is
defined as
𝑓𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡 (𝑥) = 𝐻 (Δ𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛 − 𝛼𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 ), (1)
where 𝐻 is the Heaviside step function, Δ𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛 = ∥𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛−𝑥 ∥2ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑥 ∗𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ𝑥 is
the reconstruction loss, and 𝛼𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the critical threshold. In our
experiments, we pick 𝛼𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 to be at the 95th percentile of recon-
struction losses on test set images, so that the false positive rate is
controlled at 5%.
3 THREAT MODEL
3.1 Physical Adversarial Attacks
From an attacker’s point of view, the example of self-driving car
in Figure 1 can be exploited to behave in an unintended and po-
tentially dangerous manner by taking over the steering or power
system (as was done in a non-autonomous vehicle [11]), poisoning
the neural network training data to plant backdoors [24], manip-
ulating the capturing or preprocessing procedure to modify im-
ages to have human-imperceptible perturbations that target neural
networks [6, 28, 34], or crafting and placing physical adversarial
objects in the environment that target the neural networks [1, 3, 20].
While attacks have been examined for all of those vulnerabilities,
placement of crafted adversarial payloads in the physical environ-
ment assumes the least amount of privileged access to the targeted
systems. Sophisticated adversarial attacks have been proposed to
create physical adversarial patches and objects that are robust to
















Figure 2: Overview of the CapsNet Detection Architecture.
computer vision pipeline such as object classification [1, 3], object
detection [7, 22], and object tracking [16].
3.2 Attack Detection
While physical payloads created by the aforementioned techniques
are in general more noticeable to humans than digital adversarial
perturbations, a system armed with an automatic detector of these
attacks can mitigate risks, as they do not require trained eyes to
identify such a situation. For example, a self-driving car can relegate
its steering to a licensed driver once it detects adversarial objects
in the environment, thereby reducing the chances of unexpected
maneuvers and traffic collisions, without requiring professionals
trained at spotting such attacks.
In this paper, we concentrate on detecting the presence of adver-
sarial patches or objects in the object classification pipeline, as it
is relatively easy to demonstrate and measure the results. It is also
possible to adapt our model to a more complex computer vision
system (CVS). To evaluate the effectiveness of our detection method,
we assume the worst-case scenario for adversarial patch or object
attacks, in which the threat actors possess access to parameters of
the neural network model in the CVS, even though they do not
possess privileged access to the instance of the targeted system.
This white-box scenario is a reasonable assumption, as it has been
shown to be possible for an attacker to transfer payloads trained
against a substitute model to the targeted black-box model that
attackers do not have access to [30]. With this assumption, we then
evaluate the effectiveness of the detection method by analyzing its
robustness to two attacks:
(1) A naive white-box attack that focuses on creating a strong
attack against the classifier with no regard for the detection
in place.
(2) An adaptive white-box attack that attempts to fool both the
classifier and the detector.
For detection to be considered effective, it needs to not only ef-
fectively detect strong naive attacks, but also maintain a reasonable
performance against adaptive attacks. This evaluation methodology
is identical to the ones used by Biggio et al. [2] and Carlini and
Wagner [4]. The two attacks used for evaluation are described in
detail in Section 5.1.
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Dataset A B C D E X Y
smallNORB 64 8 16 16 5 0 0
MNIST 64 8 16 16 10 512 1024
SVHN 128 32 24 32 10 512 1024
CIFAR10 128 24 24 32 10 512 1024
Table 1: Number of convolutional kernels (A - Conv), num-
ber of capsule kernels (B - PrimCaps, C - ConvCaps1, D -
ConvCaps2), number of class capsules (E - ClassCaps), and
number of hidden neurons (X - Hidden FC1, Y - Hidden
FC2) for the layers in our architecture on different datasets.
Other than the number of class capsules, they were arbitrar-
ily selected for each dataset. For experiments conducted on
the same dataset, these numbers remain unchanged, even if
other hyperparameters settings such as _𝑎 or architectural
settings such as MCD may differ.
4 NETWORK ARCHITECTURES
4.1 CNN
The CNN architecture mostly follows AlexNet [19], with modifi-
cations to allow for class conditional reconstruction as in Qin et
al. [31]. In particular, we substitute the penultimate fully connected
layer in AlexNet with logistic regressions on 𝑘 embedding class
vectors, one for each class in the dataset, each of size𝑚. We set
𝑚 = 16, which is the same size as the matrix capsules used for
reconstruction in the capsule architectures. We also substitute the
last layer in AlexNet to linearly transform each of the 𝑘 embedding
vectors into a logit, stacked together before softmax activation,
which yields the probabilities for each of the 𝑘 classes. From the
penultimate layer consisted of 𝑘 logistic regressions, we select a
single embedding vector from the 𝑘 class vectors, which is either
the vector for the ground truth class during training time, or the
predicted class at test time.
The selected class embedding vector is then fed into the decoder
portion of the network. The decoder consists of two hidden fully
connected layers (Hidden FC1, Hidden FC2) with hypertangent
activation and an output layer (Reconstruction Output Layer) that
has the same number of neurons as the number of pixels in the
input image. The reconstructed output is compared to the input
image, which yields the reconstruction loss. The reconstruction loss
is compared to a threshold for detection and minimized during
model training and adaptive attack optimization. The input images
are scaled to side lengths of 224 in order to be consistent with [19].
4.2 CapsNet Architecture
We utilize two CapsNet-based architectures for detection. The base-
line model is the one proposed by Hinton et al. [14], while the other
model includes the two modifications discussed in Section 4.3. They
both consist of a classifier and a decoder.
The classifier is identical to Hinton et al.’s [14] in both models,
and as shown in Figure 2, it consists of a convolutional layer (Conv),
followed by a primary capsule layer (PrimCaps), followed by two
convolutional capsule layers (ConvCaps1, ConvCaps2), and finally
followed by a class capsule layer (ClassCaps). As inHinton et al. [14],
we have kernel size of 5 in Conv, 1 in PrimCaps, and 3 in ConvCaps1























Figure 3: An abstraction of our modified matrix capsule
layer, with MCD (Section 4.3) and affine voting (Section 4.3).
convolutional kernels, capsules, and fully connected neurons differ
by the dataset (Table 1), but are the same for our two models. The
class capsule layer outputs a classification loss for model training
or an adversarial cost for attack optimization. The classification
loss is a modified version of hinge loss [14].
In both of our CapsNet models, a capsule is selected from the
class capsule layer, which is either the capsule for the ground truth
class during training time or, at test time, the most likely capsule.
The matrix pose of the selected capsule is flattened into a vector
and then fed into the decoder. The decoder operates just as the
decoder for the CNN.
Dataset _𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑒 _𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣,𝑓 𝑐
model patch
batch size batch size
smallNORB 0 2e-07 64 N/A
MNIST 0 2e-07 128 128
SVHN 1e-06 1e-06 24 16
CIFAR10 0 2e-07 16 16
Table 2: Regularization parameters and batch sizes for train-
ing the CapsNet architecture.
For training both our models and our patches, we use a learning
rate of 0.003 in ADAM optimizer and two routing iterations for ex-
pectation maximization. The final temperature hyperparameter for
the modified hinge loss is configured to be 0.01 for all the CapsNet
training sessions, consistent with [14]. Batch sizes and regulariza-
tion hyperparameters used to train the CapsNet architectures on
different datasets are contained in Table 2. Since CapsNets are very
slow to train, we terminate their training sessions after 5 days even
if they have not yet converged. For other implementation details,
refer to our source code to be released after publication.
4.3 Improved CapsNet
We were not able to achieve satisfactory accuracies on SVHN and
CIFAR10 using the architecture from Hinton et al. [14]. Since inputs
that are misclassified are adversarial from the start, with no effort
from the attacker, we propose two improvements on the CapsNet
architecture to get it on a more equal footing for the comparison
with AlexNet. Our Improved CapsNet differs in that the capsule
layers are configuredwithMatrix Capsule Dropout (MCD) andAffine
Voting.
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(b) Total training time of the two voting mechanisms.











































(b) median test accuracies over epochs.
Figure 5: Affine voting speeds up convergence. There is a noticeable gap between training sessions using affine voting and
linear voting, roughly between epoch 10 to epoch 25. This shows that affine voting capsules are able to converge faster.
Weprovide an intuitive explanation of these improvements along
with empirical evidence on the smallNORB dataset. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to attempt dropout and affine voting
on matrix capsule layers (Figure 3).
Matrix-Capsule-Dropout. Dropout was proposed by Srivastava
et al. [33] in 2014, and since then it has been used in almost all of the
state-of-the-art CNN architectures due to its regularizing effects.
It approximates ensemble learning in a single dense network by
randomly setting neuron activation outputs to zero with probability
𝑝 . We leverage the same intuition in designing matrix-capsule-
dropout (MCD). If a matrix capsule layer has MCD enabled, then the
output capsule activation probabilities of its EM routing procedure
during forward propagation will be randomly zero-masked with
probability 𝑝 after the last expectation maximization step.
This is a computationally inexpensive procedure, as we are only
masking the activation probabilities of the capsules without tamper-
ing with their matrix representation. In our model, we set 𝑝 = 0.5
and apply MCD to randomize the capsule activation probabilities
of the second to last and third to last layers in the classification
network, so the hidden capsules voting for class capsules in the last
layers are deactivated randomly. We are able to reduce over-fitting
and improve test accuracy with this implementation, as shown in
Table 3. The choices regarding 𝑝 and affected layers were made
without hyperparameter optimization, so better results may be
possible. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to
implement dropout on matrix capsule layers.
We also attemptedDropRoute, an adaptation of DropConnect [36]
on the Routing by Agreement mechanism, by randomly assigning
routing weights to zero after each expectation maximization step.
As we can see from Table 3, DropRoute was not effective.
Affine Voting. Hinton et al. mention that a lower-level capsule
calculates its votes for capsules in the higher levels by “multiply-
ing its own pose matrix by trainable viewpoint-invariant trans-
formation matrices that could learn to represent part-whole re-
lationships” [14]. In other words, votes on higher-layer capsules’
pose matrices are linear transformations of lower-layer capsules.
Geometrically, the relationships between higher- and lower-layer
capsule poses estimated by those linear votes are compositions of
rotations, reflections, and scaling.
On the other hand, our architecture calculates the votes through
affine transformations, which multiplies a pose matrix with a train-
able transformation matrix, followed by addition of a trainable bias
matrix.While this is partly inspired by the use of bias terms in CNNs,
geometrically affine transformations can model compositions of
rotations, reflections, and scaling, followed by translations [37].
Thus, they are strictly more expressive than that of the default
linear transformations proposed in the EM Routing paper, and can




Train Acc. Test Acc. Train Acc. Test Acc. Train Acc. Test Acc.
100.00% 94.52% 99.99% 95.52% 99.82% 94.31%
99.99% 94.04% 99.79% 95.44% 99.80% 93.69%
99.99% 94.48% 99.96% 95.72% 99.65% 94.70%
99.99% 94.28% 100.00% 95.52% 99.85% 93.69%
Mean 99.99% 94.33% 99.94% 95.55% 99.78% 94.10%
Table 3: Statistics from twelve 120-hour training sessions on smallNORB dataset (lasting 220-240 epochs each). The train par-
tition accuracies and test partition accuracies from the epoch checkpoints with the best test partition accuracies are reported,
for each training session. We can see that matrix-capsule-dropout (MCD) noticeably reduces over-fitting.
capsules. This, however, comes at the cost of doubling the amount
of trainable parameters in capsule layers with all else unchanged.
To evaluate the effect of affine transformations, we compared the
training and testing performances of linear voting and affine voting
on the smallNORB dataset, with ten training sessions for each vot-
ing mechanism. We find that affine voting significantly increases
post-convergence accuracy. In Figure 4a, we illustrate the empirical
density of differences in test accuracies between affine voting and
linear voting in the range from 70 and 100 epochs, where the train-
ing has converged. The density is normally distributed (Shapiro-
Wilk p=0.840), and we find a statistically significant improvement
for affine voting, as indicated by a rejection of the hypothesis that
the differences are centered at zero (one-tailed T-test, p=0.010). Fur-
thermore, affine voting only increases the time per epoch by about
2% (Figure 4b), while speeding up convergence overall by reducing
the number of training epochs needed to get good accuracies (Fig-
ure 5). Note that our training times reached over 60 hours for 100
epochs, so the trade-off of a relatively lower accuracy for a faster
training time may be worthwhile in some applications.
5 DETECTION EXPERIMENT SETUP
We now present the setup for our adversarial patch detection ex-
periments. Section 5.1 elaborates on the optimization objective
for training the adversarial patches, while Section 5.2 defines the
evaluation metrics. Note that since physical adversarial attacks are
generally first created digitally then transferred over to the physical
domain [1, 3], it is plausible that the effectiveness of the detector
on the digital attacks also transfers to the physical domain.
5.1 Adversarial Optimization Objective
We use two types of adversarial patching attacks, a naive whitebox
attack and an adaptive whitebox attack, to assess detection perfor-
mance.
Both attacks use an overarching optimization objective based on
Expectation over Transformation (EOT) [1]. With EOT, optimization
objective in both attacks can be expressed as:
\𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ = argmin
\𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ
E𝑥∼𝑋,𝑡∼𝑇,𝑙∼𝐿 [𝐽𝑎𝑑𝑣 (𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑙, 𝑃, \𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ, 𝐴)], (2)
where \𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ ∈ 𝑅𝑤
′,ℎ′,3 are parameters for the patch of width𝑤 ′
and height ℎ′, 𝑋 is the training set of images, 𝑇 is the distribution
of transformations, 𝐿 is the distribution of locations over images,
𝐽𝑎𝑑𝑣 is the scalar valued adversarial cost function, 𝑃 : 𝑅𝑤
′,ℎ′,3 →
[0, 1]𝑤′,ℎ′,3 is a differentiable function transforming the patch pa-
rameters into an RGB patch, and 𝐴 : [0, 1]𝑤′,ℎ′,3, [0, 1]𝑤,ℎ,3,𝑇 , 𝐿 →
[0, 1]𝑤,ℎ,3 is a differentiable function applying the patch onto the
training RGB image with width𝑤 and height ℎ. Note that the RGB
values in this paper are floats between 0 and 1 due to dataset nor-
malization. For both attacks,
𝑃 (\𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ) = (𝑡𝑎𝑛ℎ(\𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ) + 1𝑤′×ℎ′)/2 (3)
which transforms the patch parameters in 𝑅𝑤
′,ℎ′,3 to [0, 1]𝑤,ℎ,3,
and thus prevents the need for clipping functions to restrict the
image in normalized RGB space. This improves the effectiveness of
gradient descent on the smoother objective function and is inspired
by the Change of Variables approach from [6].
Our attacks use the patch applier function𝐴 from the source code
used by Brown et al. [3], which samples from the distribution of
random transformations, locations, training images, and returns a
new imagewith the randomly transformed patchmasking a random
location on the training image. We also use the same parameters
for 𝐴, except we changed the uniform distribution of patch scaling
to be between 10% and 50% of the input image instead of between
30% and 150%. This was to improve the patching effectiveness at
lower scales.
Given the attacker’s goal of causing misclassification, the neural
network’s confidence on the correct class needs to be lower than its
confidence on the incorrect classes. Due to the universal nature of
physical adversarial objects and patches, the most straightforward
method to cause misclassification is to aim at a single adversarial
target class 𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑣 . In our experiments, we arbitrarily set 𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑣 = 0.
Both attacks use an iterative numericalmethod, namelyADAM [17],
to search for the strongest \𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ , due to its relative efficiency com-
pared to other iterative methods and its ability to find stronger
adversarial solutions than analytical methods [6]. It is also rela-
tively insensitive to hyperparameter choices.
The two attacks differ in their adversarial cost function 𝐽𝑎𝑑𝑣 ,
which we define as follows.
Naive Whitebox Attack. For this attack, in complement to the
overall optimization framework in Equation 2, we have,
𝐽𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑒 (𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑙, 𝑃, \𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ, 𝐴) = max( max
𝑖≠𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑣
(𝑍 (𝑥 ′)𝑖 ) − 𝑍 (𝑥 ′)𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑣 )+,−^)
(4)
where 𝑍 (𝑥 ′)𝑖 is the logit for the activation of class 𝑖 capsule, ^ is
the ideal confidence gap between 𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑣 and the next most confident
class, and 𝑥 ′ is the adversarially patched image. We can define 𝑥 ′
as:
𝑥 ′ = 𝐴(𝑃 (\𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ), 𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑙) (5)
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CNN CapsNet Improved CapsNet
Test Acc.: 99.50% Test Acc.: 99.32% Test Acc.: 99.50%
_𝑎 ADR AFR ASR ADR AFR ASR ADR AFR ASR
0 0.180235 0.002551 0.000887 0.985786 0.052193 0.002554 0.987896 0.026430 0.001222
0.5 0.167258 0.002329 0.001331 0.962798 0.042199 0.003665 0.971793 0.026874 0.004664
1 0.194099 0.001664 0.000998 0.869961 0.025208 0.005552 0.812660 0.017324 0.005997
1.5 0.160825 0.002329 0.001664 0.748917 0.015547 0.004220 0.604886 0.010661 0.003443
2 0.174579 0.001996 0.001331 0.605775 0.010105 0.002443 0.522710 0.010883 0.003887
2.5 0.190772 0.001775 0.000998 0.514936 0.008773 0.002332 0.472959 0.008884 0.003554
3 0.154281 0.001886 0.001442 0.459856 0.007885 0.001444 0.443753 0.006996 0.002443
3.5 0.165373 0.002773 0.001775 0.446086 0.008440 0.001333 0.421877 0.007440 0.003554
4 0.166260 0.001442 0.000887 0.440422 0.007551 0.001888 0.407773 0.006108 0.003220
4.5 0.164485 0.002884 0.001886 0.435980 0.008329 0.002110 0.379678 0.005441 0.002665
5 0.165594 0.002329 0.001886 0.429872 0.007885 0.001110 0.363021 0.004109 0.001999
10 0.158829 0.001109 0.000776 0.420988 0.005886 0.001333 0.356469 0.003665 0.001777
100 0.082298 0.002107 0.001775 0.423431 0.006996 0.000777 0.360355 0.005108 0.002443
1000 0.074091 0.001886 0.001553 0.429539 0.007218 0.000888 0.359134 0.003554 0.001777
10000 0.077751 0.002551 0.002218 0.423987 0.007218 0.001110 0.359578 0.003554 0.001333
Table 4: Evaluation statistics of patches on the MNIST dataset, randomly applied to 40% of input image area. Statistics for the
naive attack (_𝑎 = 0) and the adaptive attack (_𝑎 > 0) with the best 𝐴𝑆𝑅 are in bold text.
This adversarial cost function is similar to the most powerful objec-
tive identified by Carlini and Wagner [6], with the two differences
being that we optimize over batches of adversarially patched im-
ages rather than perturbation over a single image, and we do not
seek to minimize the distance between 𝑥 ′ and 𝑥 , since we expect
the patch to be visible to human observers. We set ^ = 20, as this
confidence gap was found to increase the transferability of adver-
sarial perturbations [6]. It is possible that other values of ^ could
achieve better adversarial patching results.
AdaptiveWhitebox Attack. As we seek to both fool the classifier
and evade the detector (Equation 1) with this attack, we modify
the adversarial cost function 𝐽𝑎𝑑𝑣 to include the constraint that
𝑓𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑥) = 0. However, as the Heaviside step function does not
have a non-zero gradient outside the decision boundary, the La-
grangian method cannot directly be used for this constraint. Instead,
we rephrase the constraint as Δ𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 0, and include a Lagrangian
term for this constraint so that the generated patch will seek to not
only fool the detector but also minimize the reconstruction loss.
We then have,
𝐽𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 (𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑙, 𝑃, \𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ, 𝐴, _𝑎)
= 𝐽𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑣𝑒 (𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑙, 𝑃, \𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ, 𝐴) + _𝑎 ∗ Δ𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛, (6)
where _𝑎 is a new hyperparameter that serves as the Lagrangian
multiplier and balances the objective to fool the classifier and the
constraint to evade the detector. To determine the strongest _𝑎
that yields the highest proportion of undetected successful at-
tacks, we utilized a simple grid search on [0,0.5,1,1.5,2,2.5,3,3.5,
4,4.5,5,10,100,1000,10000].
In our experiments, patches developed with the two methods
are applied to and optimized over the test set images, in contrast to
the CapsNet models, which are trained on the training set images.
This is to maximize the effectiveness and the threat of adversarial
patches on the test set images. We use the same batch sizes and
learning rates to train the CapsNet patches as we used to train the
CapsNet models in Section 4. This is also the case for training the
CNN patches on MNIST. However, we used a higher learning rate
(0.01) to train the CNN patches on SVHN and CIFAR10, in order to
reduce underfitting.
5.2 Evaluating the Patches
For each dataset, we separately trained the patches against the three
architectures (CNN, CapsNet, and improved CapsNet) with different
values of _𝑎 , using the optimization objective from Equation 6. Note
that when _𝑎 = 0, the adaptive attack (Equation 6) is identical to the
naive attack (Equation 4), and evaluating the adaptive attack with
_𝑎 = 0 is as same as evaluating the naive attack. We thus highlight
statistics for the _𝑎 that results in the highest adversarial success
rates (ASR) for each dataset, as well as the statistics for _𝑎 = 0 to
compare naive and adaptive attacks, in Tables 4, 5, and 6.
Adversarial Success Rate (ASR). We define ASR as the propor-
tion of adversarial inputs that both fool the classifier and evade
the detector on test set images. ASR is an overall metric that can
be interpreted as how effective the adversarial patch is against a
protected model that has a detector.
Adversarial Fooling Rate (AFR). We also show AFR, the pro-
portion of adversarial inputs that fool the classifier. AFR is only
impacted by the effectiveness of the patch on the classifier and not
the detector. AFR can be interpreted as how effective the adversarial
patch is against the model unprotected by a detector.
Adversarial Detection Rate (ADR). We define ADR as the pro-
portion of adversarial inputs that are detected as adversarial. ADR
can be interpreted as the recall rate for the detector, the higher it
is, the better it is for the detector.
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CNN CapsNet Improved CapsNet
Test Acc.: 92.42% Test Acc.: 90.92% Test Acc.: 94.8%
_𝑎 ADR AFR ASR ADR AFR ASR ADR AFR ASR
0 0.248548 0.026148 0.019354 0.835289 0.147251 0.022895 0.606678 0.161973 0.065217
0.5 0.301668 0.034713 0.025983 0.854478 0.155528 0.025860 0.628376 0.167078 0.058753
1 0.253037 0.025942 0.019559 0.767181 0.156805 0.044472 0.534956 0.162055 0.076910
1.5 0.253572 0.025077 0.019106 0.467861 0.149146 0.083467 0.531538 0.156868 0.072587
2 0.257031 0.022112 0.017089 0.142598 0.065596 0.058596 0.498600 0.149457 0.073164
2.5 0.292938 0.032777 0.024707 0.175046 0.121762 0.105950 0.502470 0.172843 0.087080
3 0.290097 0.033560 0.025654 0.151081 0.110397 0.098744 0.435359 0.162097 0.089962
3.5 0.236813 0.020136 0.014577 0.107227 0.061561 0.057113 0.410985 0.150856 0.090909
4 0.252954 0.021289 0.016636 0.110397 0.079020 0.073461 0.368454 0.144928 0.093462
4.5 0.243031 0.025489 0.019106 0.110644 0.082232 0.076343 0.378047 0.152297 0.095850
5 0.242619 0.020877 0.016306 0.106280 0.077208 0.072102 0.330781 0.141881 0.097908
10 0.247643 0.030389 0.023760 0.083385 0.049043 0.046613 0.081316 0.063282 0.060647
100 0.128227 0.027754 0.024501 0.066337 0.025530 0.023965 0.056448 0.005517 0.005147
1000 0.082438 0.018571 0.016348 0.065761 0.023060 0.021618 0.056777 0.005147 0.004694
10000 0.079185 0.014906 0.013012 0.066543 0.022483 0.021124 0.056283 0.004488 0.004076
Table 5: Evaluation statistics of patches on the SVHN dataset, randomly applied to 40% of input image area. Statistics for the
naive attack (_𝑎 = 0) and the adaptive attack (_𝑎 > 0) with the best 𝐴𝑆𝑅 are in bold text.
Since we are using targeted attacks with target class 𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑣 = 0,
input images with a ground truth of 𝑦 = 0 are not included in the
analysis. The detection false positive rate is controlled at 0.05 per
Section 2.
During evaluation, the patches are applied at random locations
and rotations as they were during training, but they are scaled
to cover 40% of the input image instead of a randomly sized area.
The reason we use 40% instead of smaller sizes is that the patches
are ineffective at fooling the classifier if scaled any smaller. To
demonstrate this, we plot (in the Appendix) the𝐴𝐷𝑅,𝐴𝐹𝑅, and𝐴𝑆𝑅
at different scales for the naive (_𝑎 = 0) patch and most effective
adaptive (_𝑎 ≠ 0) patch for each detector on each dataset. We also
show example patches in the Appendix as well.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the experimental results of adversarial
detection on MNIST, SVHN, and CIFAR10 datasets, using the CNN
and both the original and improved CapsNet. The effectiveness
of adversarial patches against the classifier and the detector are
displayed in Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6 for MNIST, SVHN, and
CIFAR10 datasets, respectively. We will only analyze the bolded
statistics, which correspond to the naive attack and the best adaptive
attack for an architecture on a dataset, unless otherwise stated.
6.1 Results
Results on MNIST. We first observe that the overall fooling rates
(𝐴𝐹𝑅s) are quite low across the board at between 0.2-5.2%, leading
to low attacker success rates (𝐴𝑆𝑅) of between 0.1-0.6%. MNIST’s
low resolution makes it difficult to craft successful attacks. In terms
of detection (𝐴𝐷𝑅), both CapsNets substantially outperform the
CNN at detecting the attack, with over 81% 𝐴𝐷𝑅 compared with
just 7.8% 𝐴𝐷𝑅 for the best adaptive attack. The improved CapsNet
is slightly worse overall than the original CapsNet on both 𝐴𝐷𝑅
and 𝐴𝑆𝑅, showing that the original CapsNet is better in detecting
attacks, though it features lower 𝐴𝐹𝑅.
Results on SVHN. First, we note that our improved CapsNet out-
performs CNN and the original CapsNet on benign test accuracy
by more than 2% and 3.5%, respectively, showing the benefits of our
modifications. Against both naive and adaptive attacks, however,
the CNN offers very low fooling rates and thereby performs the
best with just 1.9% 𝐴𝑆𝑅 for naive attacks and 2.6% 𝐴𝑆𝑅 for the best
adaptive attack. The improved CapsNet has a significantly worse
detection rate (𝐴𝐷𝑅) than the original CapsNet, but it shows im-
provements against adaptive attacks with 33.1% 𝐴𝐷𝑅 versus 17.5%
𝐴𝐷𝑅 for original CapsNet.
Results onCIFAR10. OnCIFAR10, the CNN offers the best benign
test accuracy at 80.1%, 13.8% better than CapsNet and 4.6% better
than the improved CapsNet. The fooling rate (𝐴𝐹𝑅) is much higher
on CIFAR10 than the previous two datasets at between 30-57% for
the settings with the best 𝐴𝑆𝑅 results. Here, the naive attack is best
countered by the CNN at 23.5% 𝐴𝑆𝑅, but the adaptive attack is best
countered by the improved CapsNet at 29.4%𝐴𝑆𝑅, which is 6.2% and
17.8% better than the CNN and original CapsNet, respectively. The
improved CapsNet’s performance on adaptive attacks is marked by
both the highest detection rate and the lowest fooling rate of the
three models.
6.2 Analysis
Does the DetectionWork? First, we see that in every set of bolded
statistics, including the adaptive patches, 𝐴𝑆𝑅 is lower than 𝐴𝐹𝑅
by a noticeable amount. This means that a smaller proportion of
patched images both fool the classifier and evade detector, than
fooling the classifier alone. In other words, some otherwise success-
ful attacks are being detected by the architecture, for every naive
attack and best adaptive attack on each dataset with each archi-
tecture. Had the detector been ineffective, we would see similar
numbers for 𝐴𝑆𝑅 and 𝐴𝐹𝑅.
This is most pronounced on the CapsNet architectures onMNIST
(Table 4), where for the improved CapsNet, the best adaptive attack
has 𝐴𝑆𝑅 ≈ 0.005 and 𝐴𝐹𝑅 ≈ 0.025, which means only around a
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CNN CapsNet Improved CapsNet
Test Acc.: 80.81% Test Acc.: 67.99% Test Acc.: 76.2%
_𝑎 ADR AFR ASR ADR AFR ASR ADR AFR ASR
0 0.308582 0.307248 0.234549 0.554024 0.564695 0.270565 0.404333 0.380444 0.247778
0.5 0.308359 0.304357 0.220542 0.569253 0.513673 0.229658 0.421778 0.352000 0.224333
1 0.278235 0.446532 0.342152 0.542019 0.587594 0.282125 0.380444 0.364222 0.246778
1.5 0.315362 0.424522 0.310805 0.469320 0.655069 0.373055 0.373444 0.353000 0.238000
2 0.307248 0.350823 0.257225 0.475767 0.517119 0.282237 0.345778 0.365000 0.259333
2.5 0.301356 0.467652 0.349378 0.439084 0.670187 0.397510 0.333222 0.365778 0.267000
3 0.269787 0.413851 0.317919 0.407514 0.601823 0.375500 0.301667 0.317333 0.242222
3.5 0.310805 0.394842 0.294020 0.400622 0.566363 0.354936 0.289667 0.248222 0.193667
4 0.294131 0.386060 0.291018 0.371276 0.672743 0.443753 0.284889 0.262222 0.203333
4.5 0.316696 0.393953 0.284349 0.361272 0.585038 0.384838 0.238000 0.238778 0.193667
5 0.293241 0.391285 0.295798 0.335816 0.630058 0.433859 0.252889 0.365000 0.294111
10 0.317363 0.413517 0.306025 0.187528 0.568253 0.472099 0.158111 0.287889 0.253556
100 0.243775 0.448755 0.355825 0.040907 0.057803 0.055024 0.037889 0.024667 0.023444
1000 0.078257 0.336483 0.316807 0.040907 0.049133 0.046354 0.037333 0.019000 0.017667
10000 0.048911 0.021787 0.020787 0.041018 0.047577 0.044242 0.039222 0.017000 0.016000
Table 6: Evaluation statistics of patches on the CIFAR10 dataset, randomly applied to 40% of input image area. Statistics for
the naive attack (_𝑎 = 0) and the adaptive attack (_𝑎 > 0) with the best 𝐴𝑆𝑅 are in bold text.
fifth of the attacks that cause misclassification are undetected. Even
on CIFAR10 (Table 6), where the difference is less significant, we
have 𝐴𝑆𝑅 ≈ 0.79𝐴𝐹𝑅 on the CNN architecture. This shows that the
detector retains some of its potency even against adaptive patch
attacks, which is in stark contrast with the results from Qin et
al. [31] on adversarial example detection. in which the detectors
typically lose their effectiveness against an adaptive attack. Albeit
not conclusively, this supports our intuition that digital adversarial
example detection methods can be transferred to the adversarial
patching domain, and that adversarial patches are easier to detect
than digital adversarial examples.
Is the Adaptive Attack Doing Its Job? The "aggressiveness" of
the adaptive attack is governed by the multiplier _𝑎 in Equation 6.
The higher _𝑎 , the more our adversarial objective is dedicated to
minimizing the reconstruction loss, and hypothetically the less the
patches become detected. Our data follows the hypothesis, showing
that 𝐴𝐷𝑅 generally decreases as _𝑎 increases. Furthermore, on all
datasets and against all architectures, the best adaptive patch has a
higher𝐴𝑆𝑅 than the naive patch. Thus we believe that our adaptive
attack is a reasonable attempt.
Unmodified CapsNet vs. Improved CapsNet. The hyperparam-
eters and architecture of CapsNet and improved CapsNet are identi-
cal on each dataset, besides the modifications on the improved Cap-
sNet discussed in Section 4. They were manually tuned to improve
their test set accuracies on each dataset. Note that the improved
CapsNet architectures are able to achieve significantly higher test
accuracy (94.8% on SVHN, 76.2% on CIFAR10) compared to the
unmodified CapsNet (90.92% on SVHN, 67.99% on CIFAR10) on
the CIFAR10 dataset. This helps make the classifier more robust to
adversarial attacks, as fewer input images would be adversarial by
default, which explains the huge differences between 𝐴𝑆𝑅 on the
CIFAR10 dataset, not just on the highlighted patches but across all
of them.
Comparison among Datasets. We can observe from Table 4, 5
and 6 that 𝐴𝑆𝑅 across all the three architectures increases with the
increase in dataset complexity. 𝐴𝑆𝑅 on MNIST dataset is less than
0.01 whereas it is between 0.01 and 0.1 for SHVN, and between
0.23 and 0.47 for CIFAR10. 𝐴𝐹𝑅 shows a similar trend in terms of
higher data complexity and higher fooling rate, with 𝐴𝐹𝑅 < 0.06
on MNIST, 0.02 < 𝐴𝐹𝑅 < 0.17 on SVHN, and 0.30 < 𝐴𝐹𝑅 < 0.57 on
CIFAR10. 𝐴𝐷𝑅 also follows the same pattern, the higher the data
complexity, 𝐴𝐷𝑅 tends to be lower in both unmodified CapsNet
and improved CapsNet, and in CNN for SVHN and CIFAR10. These
results suggest that adversarial patch attacks might behave similarly
with adversarial examples in that they are harder to detect on more
complex dataset.
MNIST on CNN has a surprisingly low 𝐴𝐷𝑅 of 0.08 against the
best performing adaptive patch, and 0.18 against the naive patch.
Two possible factors might have contributed to this anomaly. One
is that we upscale the input images for the CNN on all datasets
to [224, 244, 3] to be consistent with [19], which causes it to per-
form worse than on the [28, 28, 3] MNIST dataset, compared to the
[32, 32, 3] SVHN and CIFAR10 datasets. Another possibility is that
since we use the same CNN architecture hyperparameters for all
three datasets, the hyperparameters just happen to perform simi-
larly in terms of 𝐴𝐷𝑅 on the the [32, 32, 3] datasets, and worse on
the [28, 28, 3] MNIST dataset.
7 DISCUSSION
Our detection approach only requires one forward pass without
the time and memory requirements of back propagation and is
faster than that of SentiNet [8]. This allows safety-critical systems
to rapidly sound the alarm when an attack is taking place. Never-
theless, for our approach to be used in real world computer vision
systems, reconstruction networks needs to be able to reliably scale
up to more complex datasets such as ImageNet. On the bright side,
we showed that a detection method originally proposed against
digital adversarial examples can be effective against adversarial
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patches with some modifications, and other perturbation detection
methods are worth a try to mitigate risks brought on by physical
adversarial attacks.
We also find that the distribution of reconstruction errors tends
have higher means with larger variance on CIFAR10 and SVHN
than on MNIST. This could be due to the fact that CIFAR10 and
SVHN are non-segmented images containing background noise
or even multiple classes of objects. If this is indeed the case, then
the architecture needs to learn to segment the background noise
from the class objects to more effectively detect adversarial attacks
on more complex datasets. This might be achievable through new
architectures that can learn segmentation in an unsupervised man-
ner, or supervised training on image segmentation. We leave this
investigation as a part of future work.
8 CONCLUSION
We have shown that capsule networks can be improved using
matrix-capsule-dropout and affine voting, techniques inspired by
convolutional neural network, and that adversarial digital perturba-
tion detection techniques can be used against adversarial physical
payloads with some success. This is promising for the small but
growing literature on capsule networks and defenses against adver-
sarial physical attacks, as advances in adjacent but more substantial
fields (convolutional neural networks and adversarial digital per-
turbations, respectively) may be transferred over.
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Detecting Adversarial Patches with Class Conditional Reconstruction Networks , ,
A PATCHES AND STATISTICS
VISUALIZATION
This section contains visualization of patches and their adversarial




(b) ADR, AFR, and ASR for Patches Scaled to Different Sizes of Input.
Figure 6: Naive Adversarial Attack.
(a) Patches.
(b) ADR, AFR, and ASR for Patches Scaled to Different Sizes of Input.
Figure 7: Best Adaptive Adversarial Attack.
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